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1. Introduction and su1nmary 
In "Desisjonsteorien og Neyman-Pearson teoriens stilling 
idag", Sverdrup [3:\ considers in section II, O,D and E, conditional 
te~t methods, and he discusses the well known fact that the prin-
ciple of unbiasedness in certain cases implies conditional tests. 
Sv~rdrup doubts, (illustrated by examples), that the principle 
of unbiasedness always is the real reason for choosing conditional 
te$ts. He suggests that the ancillary principle, introduced by 
Fisher [~j, might be more basic. We exhibit, however, in section 
3 of the present paper, an example which shows that one can get 
poor tests if one condition on a statistic which is ancillary in 
the commonly accepted sense of this term. We analyze the reason 
for this shortcoming, arid we propose that the usual explanation 
of ancillary statistics should be supplemented, resulti~g in a 
definition in section 3 below. 
2. Statistical decisions. Unbiasedness. Conditioning. 
A statistical decision problem can usually be fo~mulated 
in the following way: X is a stochastic variable with proba-
bility measure P. (In this paper the stochastic variables and 
the. parameters may be multidimensional.) A priori P ~ •'.'--, where 
, ... ~\ 
r.)'-' is a given class of probability measures. Based upon an obsex 
vation of X we shall choose a subclass of (~·}-'> which we believe 
contains P, or we shall give an estimate for P. 
Suppose for example that the probability distribution of 
X is parametric and given by f(x; '~' ) , where f is a known func ... 
tion of x when (~f is given. 
knows that , .. _) . . rt) where j ·2. 
function of _.:_) , and let 'H'l 
-.. _./ 
in • 
,, , is unknown, but a priori one 
is a given set. Let Q be a known 
be the range of Q when ,_,_:• varies 
In point estiruo.tion one gives an estimate of 9(u.)), in inteJ 
val estimation one selects an interval and states that it contains 
In hypothesis testing one specifies a subset _(( 0 of 
which is identified with the hypothesis, and by means of an ob-
servation of X the hypothesis is accepted, that is, one asserts 
\"'iO 
J ~ ; or it is rejected, that i~ one asserts r • .o.._) not in 
-2- : I 
. _; .. 
I ... 
An unbiased test is a·test such that, by applying it, the 
mi:q.imum probability for rejecting the hypothesis if it ip false, 
is not less than the maximum probabili t3r for re j eating it if it 
is true. The principle of unbiasedness sometimes implies condi-
tiqnal tests, given a statistic a(X). That is, a(X) is regard-
ed as given, and one constructs the test by considering the con-
ditional distribution of X, given a(X). Sverdrup [3l gives 
ex~mples, showing that the principle of unbiasedness in some 
ca~es implies tests such that one condition according to statisti-
cal intuition (see the following examples 1 and 2), in other cases 
implies tests where one condition in disagreement with statisti-
cal intuition (example 3)~ Be also shows that there are cases 
Where it seems reasonable to use a conditionaltest, but Where the 
principle of unbiasedness does not imply this conditional test 
(example 4). 
:Example 1. x1 and _x2 are independently and Poisson dis-
tr:j..buted with parameters A 1 and -t 2 respectively. The hypo-
thesis is ./(_ 2 £ a ) 1 , where a is givenf The principle of unbi-
asedness implies conditional tests, given X1 + X2 • Conditional 
distribution of x2 , given_ x1 + x2 , is binomial and depends on 
,d. 1 and // 2 through /;: 2/ ? 1 • Moreover, there exists a uni-
formly most powerful conditional i -level test. 
Example 2. Given a double dichotomic frequency table and 
consider testing of independence, assuming multinomial distribu-
t~on, or assuming two binomial distributions. The prinoiP,.fe of 
~~biasedness implies conditional tests, given the marginal:s. 
Example 3. x1 , ••• ,Xn are independently and identically 
normally distributed with expectation ~- and variance o 2 • The 
2 . t . • .. k rb 2 where k l.' s gl.'ven hypothesis is S 4:- k o-- aga1.ns :; /... .....~ ' • 
v = -~; x. and y = ·~;; X~ together are sufficient for ( s , cr ) • The 
- l. ...... l. 
principle afunbiasedness implies conditional tests, given Y. 
' . ., *) Sverdrup ~3J says : 
*) Translated by the present author. 
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"Ju$tification of conditioning 
Conditional testing has bothered the statistj,aiqns through 
many years.. One has felt that one cannot arbitrarily condition 
the tests. One needs certain rules. A classical example is 
example 2 above with double dichotomy. Can one just assume that 
th~ marginals are given non~stochastical variables, regardless 
whether or not they are chosen in advance of the statistical 
experiment? Another classical example is regression analysis (see 
example 5 below). Should the independent variables be conside~ced 
as"given"("fixed") variables or as stochastical variables? 
The problem has also been formulated as a problem of what-1, 
the right sample space should be or what the "hypothetical repe=:::.; 
titions" are. 
If one is looking for a fixed rule, one can use unbiasedness, 
It entails conditional tests in the examples 1, 2 and 3 and in 
many other Poisson, multinomial and linear normal situations. It 
als,o underlies combinatorial testing in non-parametric situations, 
In those cases where statistical intuition seems to indicate con-
ditional testing (examples 1 and 2), one is, however, not con-
vinced that unbiasedness was the motive. Besides, one will per-
haps feel that in some cases one is guided into wrong directions 
by the principle of inbiasedness (example 3). 
The following example is illustrating: 
Example 4 A quantity 
clear out if ~- ::: 0 or s > 
is about to be measured to 
The result of the meas~rement 
is X. There are two instruments available for measuring 
! 
According to instrument labeled 1 X is normal ( ~, o1 ), and 
according to instrument labeled 2 X is normal ( g , CY2 ) f where 
CJ1 , and 6·2 · .. are known. Let Y ( =1 or 2) be the label of the in-
strument. One wants to seek out an institute which .htts one of 
the instruments, and it seems. cdear that one should assert ~ ) 0 
.. ) 
if the instrument is labeled 1 and X > 1 • 64 o1 or if the instru-
ment is labeled 2 and X >1.64 o2 (5% level). 
-4-
This is conditional testing given Y, and it seems obviously 
reasonable. But one can argue that one is in the "wrong" sample 
space.. One should after all consider the sample space o.f (X, Y). 
Let Pr(Y=1) = p, Pr(Y=2) = 1-p. We assume p unknown •. · We 
have a nuisance parameter p in addition to the decision para-
meter <:" • By requireing unbiasedness one is lead to the just 
"' mentioned test. 
But suppose now that one was informed that the institute, 
when buying the instrument, drew lots about the instruments with 
p;obability p = ~· This should obviously be completely irrelevant. 
One can just look at the label on the instrument and ascertain 
whi9h instrument the institute in fact had bough~. The conditional 
tes} may still be reasonable. 
But this result does not follow by applying the principle 
of 1;1nbiaeedness. Thif3 principle is of help only if p is unknown. 
It is easily found that the most powerful test for the alternative 
'5 consists in rejecting the hypothesis if and only if 
. ; 2 
X .>,_f. + ~ k , where k is such that 
._-;:. 
1 r ,-~ 0--' 1 
-2 1 - G(~2~ + ~ ~.-. o--1 $ 
o-
k) 7 + .l.\'1 - G ( F + 2 k) I 0 0 5 
.J 2 ._ 2 o·-· 2 . _s _; = · • ' 
Whe:(e G is the cumulative normal distr·ibutiono~ This test does 
depend on t , and there is no uniformly' most powerful test • 
..) 
(See also 6ox U.J .) " 
Consequently, in example 4, for the hypothesis ~ = 0 
against ~ = ~- 1 , where ~ 1 is givent the unconditional 5% .... 
level test is more powerful than the conditional 5%-level test. 
Yet the conditional test is recommended, because one has a feeling 
of taking something rrrelevant into account if one uses the uncon-
ditional test. It appears from what Cox [1] says in connection 
with this example that if p = ~- and ~1 is much greater than 
o-' 2 , then the unconditional 5%-level test for the hypothesis 
s = 0 against 5 = -~ 1 , considered as a conditional test, has 
level nearly 10% if o~= ~- 1 • 
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Cox [1] says: ".S.m:roose that we know we have an observation 
from 5:~: 1 (that is, o·~ = cr' 1 ) • Th_e unconditional test says that. 
we can assign this .a hig:ger level. of significance thap. we ordi-
narily do~ because if we were to repeat the exuerimeptl we mi~ht 
sample some quite differenii__distribution. trut this fact seems ir-
rel.~v.an_t to the .i11-ter~.retation of an observation which we know came 
from a distribution with variance o1 2 ~ That is, our calculation 
of power, etc. should be made conditionally within the di~~rib~­
tion knSJ:Wl1. to ~ave been sa~J.ed,_ i.e~ if we are usip.g tests 
conventinal type, the con~ti.onal test should_be cboeen .. " 
We quote again from, Sverdrup [3] .*J: 
of the 
"Example 5 Suppose that in the conditional distribution, given )the va-riables1 . V 1 , •.• , V n, V 1 , •••. ; n tire 1.ndependently and normally distri bu-
ted with variance ~ and expectations -~ + (5 Vi; respectively, 
i=1,. ~. ,n. We want to say something about ex,, (2 , o- • If either 
(i) one does not know anything about the distribution of v 1 , ••. ,Vn 
or (ii) they are independently and normally ( )/, 7:) distributed, 
where \! and '( are unknown, then unbiasedness implies conditio-
nal testing, given v1 , •.• ,V. If, however, (iv) v 1 , .•• ,v are 
· n n 
independently and normally (0,1) distributed, then conditional 
testing is not justified by unbiasedness. There are obviously 
other reaoor-s for conditioning. The distribution of v 1 ,.~,,vn 
does not depend on (>( , (-), o·-· in any of the situations, but still 
they are of importance for the testing. They have, as Fisher 
expresses it, about the same significance as the size of the sample 
and may therefore be considered as given.n 
3. Ancillary statistics. 
The conception of "ancillary statistics" was introduced by 
R.A. Fisher [2]. If the probability model is parametric and one 
wants to say something about a parameter on the basis of an obser-
vation of the stochastic variable X, one may consider a statistic 
a(X) as given if a(X) is ancillary. There are different defi-
nitions of an ancillary statistic a(X), but a common feature of 
the definitions is that the distribution of a(X) shall not de-
pend on the parameter of interest (Fisher [2 J and Cox [1]). 
Sverdrup \3.\ mentions condition (i) in the definition below.Howeve" 
~ - . 
Translated by the present author. 
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there are situations where (i) alone implies poor tests (see example 
6). Below, we explain the reason why (i) is not sufficient for 
conditioning, and we propose that also condition (ii) shall be 
satisfied in order to denote a statistic ''ancillary" and consider 
it as given in a decision problem. 
We assume the following~ X is a stochastic variable de-
fined on a sample space ( j, )~,) (that is a space _;f where we 
have defined a o- -algebra j)~ ) . X has probability measure F,. 
A priori P r~_ c'P , where ,~'T"J is a given class of probability mea-
. . ,. ... ·~ 
sures defined on (ct. , ).f.).. Let \_~) be a set of indices and 
()~'g' g € ([} J be a family of non-empty subclasses of c9~~ such 
that if P r-:; :)u , then P belongs to one and only one c9..J g. We 
want to make inferences on g on the basis of an observation of :Z 
For instance, if we want to test a hypothesis, we may let 
,"':) 
consist of two elements, go and g 1 , where c'J g 
0 
is the 
c;~~) 
class corresponding to the hypothesis, and () g is the class 
1 
corresponding to the alternative. We then have to choose between 
Q0 and Q1 , i.e. to accept or to reject the hypothesis. 
Let a(X) be J4 -measurable. a(X) induces a sub-~-
(\ a )- a 
algebra ._;-/- of 1- • Let P be the measure P restricted to 
J~-a, and let c~F~~ be the class of all Pa with Pc:.cfg· 
Let a(X) be a statistic such that 
( i) The classes c~j~'~ , Q c C:f!), are identical. 
(ii) The class of conditional probability distributions of 
X, given a(X), Q and Pa, is independent of Pa. 
We then define a(X) to be an ancillary statistic for the 
decision problem, and we propose the following principle~ 
In the decision problem at hand, start with the conditional distri 
bution of X, given a(X). 
REMARK. Later on in this paper, we shall make a comment 
on the problem arising when there are several ancillary statistics 
The motivation for the principle is as follows: As a con-
sequence of (i) the knowledge of a(X) will give us no informa-
tion about G. So far we might use the observation of a(X) as 
the starting point and consider the conditional probability dis-
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tribution of 
Q, But when 
X given a(X) when we want to make inferences on 
a(X) is observed~ we will in general be able to 
assign subclasses 
that the unknown P is. 
rr;. 
of :·lv where it is reasonable to believe 
Then the following problem arises: 
. .-i 
Should we choose a very extensive .::..f>* where we are almost sure 
that P is~ or should we choose a less extensive ~Yi-x. where we 
are not that sure that P is? ·whichever ./]:J->~ we might choose, 
there would in general be subclasses of 2P * where we would be-
lieve more strongly that P is~ than in the rest of c::T:) * 
Thus the structure of this situation is entirely different 
from the a priori situation, where we had given a class d~) which 
we knew contained P, but where we formally did not assign any 
subclasses of c'),) where we thought it more or less likely for P 
to be. 
Ex,?.mple 6. x1' ..... ' xn are independently and identically 
normally distributed with expectation ~ and variance <Y 2 . ~ 
and CJ/ are unknown. The hypothesis is ?: { 0 against :;:::- / 0. 
The condition (i' (but not (ii)) is satisfied for the statistic 
( 1- i .-- ( -) 2) · - 1 ,. 
,i Xi ~ >.:: Xi - X , where X = n 2 Xi. Hence this statistic gives 
us no indication whether the hypothesis is true or false. But if 
we test conditionally, given this statistic, assuming nothing more 
about and o· than we did a priori, the uniformly most power· 
-ful conditional ~ -level test is the following: reject with 
probability 2 -~· if and only if X > 0. However, after having 
observed i X\ and 2 (Xi - X) 2 , we are no longer completely ig-
norant about t_ and <Y .. We can assign intervals around +I X I, 
and - \x \, and an interval around ~ .2 (Xi - X) 2 , where we have 
2 
reasons to believe that :;:- and o· respectively, are confined .• 
'::> 
If we take this information into consideration, we would surely 
use a test which is more reasonable than the test just mentioned. 
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The condition (ii) takes care of this difficulty. When 
a(X) is observed, we are no longer entirely ignorant about Pa • 
The information that a(X) gives us on P do we get only through 
a P , we are completely ignorant about the rest. But since the con-
ditional probability distribution of X, given a(X)~ Pa and G, 
does not depend on Pa, we hrm:ve now, by observing a(X), arrived at c: 
~tuation where we, because of (i), do not know more about Q than 
we did a priori, and where we, because of (ii), are unable to 
estimate some of the subclasses of the class of all conditional 
probability distributions of X givm a(X), as more likely than 
other subclasses. 
Hence there is no reason why we should not start by consider 
ing a(X) as observed, and if we do this, we have in addition 
eliminated an irrelevent "part" of c)~' , namely the "part" which 
appears when Pa varies. Hence we may specify Pa and consider 
it as given, and we may then start the decision problem by assumin€ 
a(X) as given. 
Both (i) and (ii) are satisfied for a = x1 + x2 in example 
1~ for a= Y in example 4 and for a= (V1 , ••. ,Vn) in example 5~ 
and conditioning on a is in accordance with the usual procedure 
in these cases. In ex:arnple 3, ( i) is not satisfied for a = Y, 
and conditional tests, given Y~ does not seem very convincing 
either. 
Example 2 deserves a special comment. (i) is not in genera 
satisfied for the set of those marginals which are stochastic 
variables. Suppose for example that X and Y are independent, 
X is binomial (m,p) and Y is binomial (n,q), where 0 (p,q < 1. 
Consider the hypothesis p < q against p) q. 
If m=n, then (i) is satisfied for a= X+Y. As for (ii), 
suppose that the distribution of 
p < q. Then p and q are knovm, 
of X given a does depend on p 
a is completely specified and 
and the conditional distributic 
and q through _£_ ~ 1-p q 
Hence (ii) is not satisfied. Yet it seems reasonable to conditiol 
on a. The reason for this is the following: Let a be given 
-9-
p(q and the distribution of a be roughly described, and con-
sider the corresponding class of conditional distributions of X 
given a. For other roughly described distributions of a we 
get other classes of conditional distributions of X given a. 
These classes are involved in each other to a much higher degree 
than for instance the two classes of probability distributions 
of X, for p{p 0 and p>p 0 , respectively, where 0 ;·p 0 ( 1. 
Hence (ii) is not very far from being satisfied. 
If m 4~ n, then (i) is not satisfied for a = X+Y, but 
the two classes of distributions of a for p < q and p) q, 
respectively, are strongly involved in each other. 
The principle implies that if a 1 and a 2 ?oth are ancil-
is a function of ( (a2 " ;J a1) then one lary, and a2 a1 i.e, ~1 ·- ./+ ' 
should condition on a 1 • Because, if one conditions on a 2 , i.e. 
considers conditional distribution of X, given a 2 , then a 1 is 
ancillary in this situation, and by applying the principle once 
more, one is lead to condition on a 1 • Thus if there are two 
ancillary sub-cJ -algbras (i.e. sub-o·· -algebras induced by ancil-
lary statistics), such that one of them is contained in the other, 
one should condition on that one which induces the finest (i.e. 
the most comprehensive) sub-~ -algebra. Unfortunately, in gene-
ral there exists no finest ancillary sub-~ -algebre. 
Example 7. X and 
Y = y) = Px 9 y; x=0,1 
Y are variables such that 
y=0,1, The hypothesis is 
pr(X = x, 
against p 1=p 1 = 21 4 X and Y are individually ancillary, anc 0' '0 
there is no other ancillary statistic (except the ancillary sta-
tistic which induces the trivial sub-a·-algebra). 
Hence, if a 1 and a 2 are individually ancillary, then 
(a1 , a 2 ) is not in general ancillary, and we have to choose be-
tween them (and possible other ancillary statistics) by one or 
another principle. 
An open question is how one can find the ancillary statist 
Of particular interest is to find in a given situation criteria 
of the non-existence of ancillary statistics. 
r11 
,__ _) 
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